A Privacy Framework for Mobile Health and Home-Care Systems by Kotz, David et al.
Dartmouth College 
Dartmouth Digital Commons 
Dartmouth Scholarship Faculty Work 
11-13-2009 




Intel Labs Bangalore 
Amit Baxi 
Intel Labs Bangalore 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons 
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation 
Kotz, David; Avancha, Sasikanth; and Baxi, Amit, "A Privacy Framework for Mobile Health and Home-Care 
Systems" (2009). Dartmouth Scholarship. 3476. 
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/3476 
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Work at Dartmouth Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dartmouth Scholarship by an authorized administrator of 
Dartmouth Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
dartmouthdigitalcommons@groups.dartmouth.edu. 















In this paper, we consider the challenge of preserving patient
privacy in the context of mobile healthcare and home-care
systems, that is, the use of mobile computing and commu-
nications technologies in the delivery of healthcare or the
provision of at-home medical care and assisted living. This
paper makes three primary contributions. First, we compare
existing privacy frameworks, identifying key differences and
shortcomings. Second, we identify a privacy framework for
mobile healthcare and home-care systems. Third, we ex-
tract a set of privacy properties intended for use by those
who design systems and applications for mobile healthcare
and home-care systems, linking them back to the privacy
principles. Finally, we list several important research ques-
tions that the community should address. We hope that
the privacy framework in this paper can help to guide the
researchers and developers in this community, and that the
privacy properties provide a concrete foundation for privacy-
sensitive systems and applications for mobile healthcare and
home-care systems.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
A.1 [General]: Introductory and Survey; J.3 [Computer
Applications]: Life and Medical Sciences—Medical Infor-
mation Systems, Health; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
Public Policy Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Security, Legal Aspects, Human Factors
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1. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare information technology (IT) has huge poten-
tial to improve healthcare quality, improve efficiency, and
reduce cost, and is currently on the cusp of major innova-
tions and widespread deployment in the US and elsewhere.
In this paper, we specifically examine the role of mobile
computing and communications technologies. Such mHealth
technology [25] appears promising in many ways: enabling
physicians to remotely monitor their patients’ health and
improve the quality of healthcare, enabling patients to man-
age their health more easily, enabling home-care providers
to provide better quality at-home medical care to elders and
reducing the cost of care by allowing patients to spend more
time out of the hospital. Furthermore, the UN Foundation
has recently formed the mHealth Alliance specifically to ex-
plore and promote the value of mobile computing technolo-
gies in improving healthcare in developing nations [35].
In mHealth, personal mobile devices (such as smart phones)
accompanied by wearable, portable, and even embeddable
sensors, will enable long-term continuous medical monitor-
ing [5, 21, 36] for many purposes: for outpatients with
chronic medical conditions (such as diabetes), individuals
seeking to change behavior (such as losing weight), physi-
cians needing to quantify and detect behavioral aberrations
for early diagnosis (such as depression), home-care providers
needing to track movements of elders under their care in or-
der to respond quickly to emergencies (e.g., an elder may
have fallen down) or athletes wishing to monitor their con-
dition and performance. In this paper, we use the term “Pa-
tient” to describe the subject of sensing in all such use cases.
We expect that tomorrow’s personal mobile devices will con-
tain the technology and applications needed to process sen-
sor data and enable their appropriate use. The resulting
data may be used directly by the Patient [1, 2, 37] or may
be shared with others: with a physician for treatment [33],
with an insurance company for coverage, with a home-care
provider for elder-care, with a scientist for research [12, 30],
with a coach for athletic training [4], or with family mem-
bers and friends in social-networking communities targeted
towards health and wellness.
Although mHealth systems have huge potential to im-
prove quality of healthcare and to improve quality of life,
they also generate new security and privacy issues [23]. The
technology goal should be to develop usable devices that re-
spect patient privacy while also retaining the data quality
and accessibility required for the medical uses of the data.
In this paper, we focus on privacy; specifically, we wish to
give the patient control over the data that is collected and
to whom it is disclosed, and enable the patient to recognize
that different situations may require different responses. In-
deed, we note that control, not possession or ownership, is
fundamental to privacy. Privacy means that the patient re-
tains some control even when the data is“owned”by another
party (as is common in medical records maintained by a hos-
pital) and even after a copy of the data has been provided
to another party (as when billing records are shared with an
insurance company). Security issues generated by mHealth
systems are beyond the scope of this paper.
Although the term“mHealth”applies broadly to the use of
mobile technology in healthcare applications, we focus here
on patient-centered technology, as described in the examples
above. There are, of course, valuable uses of mobile technol-
ogy in other aspects of healthcare delivery and management,
including personal digital assistants (and personal communi-
cation devices) used by clinicians, inventory-control systems
for medical equipment and consumables, and telemedicine
platforms for emergency response or remote rural health-
care. Although these mHealth applications also involve se-
curity and privacy issues, we do not address them here.
This paper makes four primary contributions. First, we
compare existing privacy frameworks, with an eye to mobile
healthcare and home-care systems (Section 3). Second, we
identify a conceptual privacy framework – a set of action-
able privacy principles – for mHealth (Section 4). Third, we
extract a set of privacy properties intended for use by those
who design systems and applications for mobile healthcare
and home-care systems (Section 5), and demonstrate their
application to a case study. Finally, Section 7 lists several
key research questions for the community.
2. BACKGROUND
Before we discuss the existing privacy frameworks, we de-
fine “privacy” in the context of healthcare, and we lay out
an abstract architecture for mHealth systems, to provide a
foundation for the discussion ahead.
Privacy.
Given our focus on privacy, it is essential that we define
it clearly for the context of healthcare. Fortunately, others
have thought deeply about this issue; we adopt the definition
selected by the National Committee for Vital and Health
Statistics (NCVHS), a key advisory committee to the US
Department of Health and Human Services. “Health infor-
mation privacy is an individual’s right to control the acquisi-
tion, uses, or disclosures of his or her identifiable health data.
Confidentiality, which is closely related, refers to the obliga-
tions of those who receive information to respect the privacy
interests of those to whom the data relate. Security is alto-
gether different. It refers to physical, technological, or ad-
ministrative safeguards or tools used to protect identifiable
health data from unwarranted access or disclosure” [11]. We
also follow NCVHS and define PHI as“personal health infor-
mation”rather than“protected health information”, which is
a phrase that has specific meaning in a HIPAA context [10].
Clearly, privacy is important in any healthcare informa-
tion system. What is different, or especially challenging
about mHealth privacy? First, mHealth allows for the col-
lection of far more medical data about the Patient, as many
mHealth devices collect data continuously over extended pe-
riods of time. Second, mHealth allows much broader range
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Figure 1: mHealth Reference Architecture
mation: in addition to collecting physiological data, many
mHealth applications will collect information about Patient
lifestyle and activities (such as food habits and diet de-
tails, location tracks, physical activity, or social interac-
tions). Third, mHealth will enable a broad range of health-
related applications: sharing data with your health provider,
as in a traditional doctor relationship, but also sharing data
with an insurance company (e.g., to confirm compliance with
a medicine regimen), with lifestyle coaches (e.g., diet advis-
ers), with athletic coaches (e.g., sports teams or health-club
trainers), with a home-care provider (e.g., to care for an el-
derly person) or with family (e.g., to support a relative’s re-
covery from surgery). In such settings, privacy is a complex
issue: the Patient needs subtle control over the collection,
recording, dissemination, and access to their mHealth data.
Architectural model.
Figure 1 portrays a high-level view of the structure and
context of patient-centric mHealth deployments. We imag-
ine an infrastructure in which each Patient carries a mobile
node (MN), which may be their mobile phone or other mo-
bile Internet device (MID), and a personal collection of sen-
sor nodes (SNs) that can measure data about their activity
(accelerometers, pedometers, GPS) or physiology (electro-
cardiograms, pulse oximeters, blood-glucose meters, weight
scales). These sensors may be carried by the patient [22],
worn by the patient [29], embedded in their living space [33],
or implanted in their body [13]. The sensors communicate
with the MN through a body-area network. The MN is
responsible for coordinating the sensors, collecting the sen-
sor data, (optionally) aggregating or pre-processing the sen-
sor data, and reporting the data to a health records sys-
tem (HRS). The MN also serves as the Patient’s primary
interface to the HRS, with respect to managing the data-
collection process and subsequent sharing of the data.
The health records system (HRS) may be a Personal Health
Record (PHR) or Electronic Health Record (EHR) system;
most of the mobile-centric research challenges will be the
same for both scenarios. We must also consider the likely
situation, over the next decade, in which a Patient must in-
teract with multiple health-records systems from multiple
providers and built on different models.
The Consumers of these records, including doctors and
other clinical personnel, insurance companies and other billing-
related personnel, researchers and regulators, access the HRS
through some Client computer. The security issues on this
platform are largely out of scope of this paper, except in
cases where we seek end-to-end technical mechanisms to sup-
port the Patient’s privacy wishes.
Finally, these people and systems need a supportive ecosys-
tem, a set of authorities and agencies that provide the regu-
latory, logistical, and technical foundation for the above re-
lationships. We can identify at least five roles to be played
by some combination of public and private organizations:
• Policymakers establish laws, regulations, and stan-
dards regarding the protection of Patient privacy in
mHealth technology.
• Certification bodies attest to whether particular prod-
ucts and services meet the policies and standards.
• Manufacturers produce hardware and software prod-
ucts and services, such as the MNs, SNs, and HRS.
• Distribution & management services distribute the
hardware and software to Patients and Consumers,
and provide remote-management capabilities such as
secure, automatic software updates and remote dele-
tion of data and keys on lost devices.
• Public-key infrastructure provides the key-distribution
and certificate authorities to support the crypto-systems
used for verification (e.g., to verify the signature of a
certification body regarding an SN calibration, or to
verify the public key of a management service).
We should take care not to expect that a top-down defi-
nition of, let alone deployment of, such an infrastructure is
possible. Any such system will necessarily be defined and
deployed by many organizations and agencies, over time [32].
In the above infrastructure we expect that the Patient
would use their personal device as an MN; although the use
of a such a device is expedient, because the patient already
owns such a device and wants to carry it for other purposes,
there are many risks: the sensor data may be intercepted
(impacting privacy), tampered with (leading to improper
care decisions), or blocked (leading to loss of critical infor-
mation to researchers or care providers). Furthermore, MNs
or SNs may be lost or stolen, resulting in possible exposure
of any data or encryption keys they contain. All of these
risks can lead to dangerous consequences for the patient and
provider [20, 34].
Although any viable solution, and any real deployment,
will doubtless be more complex than implied by this figure,
this architecture provides a structural basis and terminol-
ogy for our discussion of privacy frameworks and privacy
properties, below.
3. CONCEPTUAL PRIVACY FRAMEWORKS
Given the above definition for health information privacy,
then, we define a conceptual privacy framework to be a co-
herent set of actionable principles to protect patients’ health
information privacy. When developing and deploying a health-
care information system, the system design should include
security and privacy properties that align with the principles
in the conceptual privacy framework.
Although major laws (notably HIPAA [14] and ARRA [9])
provide a legal foundation for healthcare privacy, at least in
the US, these laws provide few details. Thus, others have
set out to define conceptual privacy frameworks, privacy
principles, or best practices for privacy, in the healthcare
context. In this section, we summarize the frameworks pro-
posed by the US Office of the National Coordinator (ONC),
the Health Privacy Project, the Markle Foundation, and the
Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Tech-
nology (CCHIT).
3.1 ONC National Framework (2008)
In December 2008 the Office of the National Coordinator
for Health Information Technology (in the US Department of
Health and Human Services) released an important report,
announcing its Nationwide Privacy and Security Framework
for Electronic Exchange of Individually Identifiable Health
Information [28]. This document, which we call the “ONC
Framework”, provides the newest and most authoritative pri-
vacy framework for healthcare released in the US, so we
present it first. We quote their eight principles as follows,
adding numbers for ease of reference within this document.
Their document includes additional explanatory detail that
we do not quote here.
ONC1. INDIVIDUAL ACCESS. Individuals should
be provided with a simple and timely means to
access and obtain their individually identifiable
health information in a readable form and format.
ONC2. CORRECTION. Individuals should be pro-
vided with a timely means to dispute the accu-
racy or integrity of their individually identifiable
health information, and to have erroneous infor-
mation corrected or to have a dispute documented
if their requests are denied.
ONC3. OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY. There
should be openness and transparency about poli-
cies, procedures, and technologies that directly af-
fect individuals and/or their individually identifi-
able health information.
ONC4. INDIVIDUAL CHOICE. Individuals should
be provided a reasonable opportunity and capa-
bility to make informed decisions about the col-
lection, use, and disclosure of their individually
identifiable health information.
ONC5. COLLECTION, USE, AND DISCLOSURE
LIMITATION. Individually identifiable health
information should be collected, used, and/or dis-
closed only to the extent necessary to accomplish
a specified purpose(s) and never to discriminate
inappropriately.
ONC6. DATA QUALITY AND INTEGRITY. Per-
sons and entities should take reasonable steps to
ensure that individually identifiable health infor-
mation is complete, accurate, and up-to-date to
the extent necessary for the person’s or entity’s
intended purposes and has not been altered or
destroyed in an unauthorized manner.
ONC7. SAFEGUARDS. Individually identifiable health
information should be protected with reasonable
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards
to ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability and to prevent unauthorized or inappro-
priate access, use, or disclosure.
ONC8. ACCOUNTABILITY. These principles should
be implemented, and adherence assured, through
appropriate monitoring and other means and meth-
ods should be in place to report and mitigate non-
adherence and breaches.
We next consider some important predecessors and inspi-
rations for the ONC Framework, in chronological order.
3.2 HPP best principles (1999)
The Health Privacy Working Group, organized by the
Health Privacy Project, released a set of “best principles” for
health privacy in 1999 [15]. The document, which we call
the “HPP Framework”, notes that their “principles are in-
tended to establish a comprehensive framework”. We quote
their 11 principles as follows; note that their report provides
additional depth beyond these high-level statements.
HPP1. For all uses and disclosures of health information,
health care organizations should remove personal
identifiers to the fullest extent possible, consistent
with maintaining the usefulness of the informa-
tion.
HPP2. Privacy protections should follow the data.
HPP3. An individual should have the right to access his
or her own health information and the right to
supplement such information.
HPP4. Individuals should be given notice about the use
and disclosure of their health information and their
rights with regard to that information.
HPP5. Health care organizations should implement secu-
rity safeguards for the storage, use, and disclosure
of health information.
HPP6. Personally identifiable health information should
not be disclosed without patient authorization,
except in limited circumstances. Health care or-
ganizations should provide patients with certain
choices about the use and disclosure of their health
information.
HPP7. Health care organizations should establish policies
and review procedures regarding the collection,
use, and disclosure of health information.
HPP8. Health care organizations should use an objective
and balanced process to review the use and disclo-
sure of personally identifiable health information
for research.
HPP9. Health care organizations should not disclose per-
sonally identifiable health information to law en-
forcement officials, absent a compulsory legal pro-
cess, such as a warrant or court order.
HPP10. Health privacy protections should be implemented
in such a way as to enhance existing laws prohibit-
ing discrimination.
HPP11. Strong and effective remedies for violations of pri-
vacy protections should be established.
Many of these themes resonate in the ONC Framework,
but we want to call attention to HPP2 and its underlying
detail, which notes that “All recipients of health information
should be bound by all the protections and limitations at-
tached to the data at the initial point of collection”. This
transitive application of privacy constraints does not explic-
itly appear in the ONC principles, but we believe it is an im-
portant feature and deserves its top-level appearance in the
HPP Framework. (This principle shows up again as BP6,
below.) We anticipate that there may interesting methods
for technological protection of PHI, wrapping any PHI with
privacy policies before sharing with a third party.
3.3 HPP best practices (2007)
The Health Privacy Project recently listed 10 “best prac-
tices”for employers who are developing personal health records
(PHR) [16]. We quote their list as follows, adding numbers
for reference.
BP1. Transparency and notice. Employers should
be transparent about their reasons for offering a
PHR to employees and all policies that apply to
the PHR. Employers should provide an Informa-
tion Policy Statement or Notice that clearly lays
out the ways in which information in the PHR
will be used and safeguarded. Employers should
incorporate the Notice into their health benefit
programs, and should make it available in a lay-
ered format a short concise version to accompany
a more detailed one. Employees should be in-
formed of any updates to the policy.
BP2. Education. Employees should be educated about
the benefits, functions, and content of the PHR.
Information about the PHR should be communi-
cated in numerous ways to build both knowledge
and trust.
BP3. Employees can choose which content is in-
cluded in the PHR. Employees should be able
to determine the content of the PHR, including
which providers and plans contribute to it. Em-
ployees should be able to annotate the records
submitted by others, as well as to enter their own
information, with employee-entered data marked
as such. The identification of sources of all per-
sonal health information in the PHR should be
readily apparent.
BP4. Employees control access to and use of the
PHR. A. Employees should control who is al-
lowed to access their PHRs. Employers should not
access or use employees’ individually-identifiable
health information from the PHR. B. Employ-
ees should choose, without condition, whether to
grant access to personal health information within
their PHRs for any “secondary uses”. An audit
trail that shows who has accessed the PHR should
be easily available to employees.
BP5. Employees can designate proxies to act on
their behalf. Employees should determine who,
including family members and caregivers, should
have direct access to their PHRs on their behalf.
Where possible, employees should be able to grant
proxy access to full or partial information in their
PHRs, including access in emergency circumstances.
Employees should also have the ability to revoke
access privileges.
BP6. “Chain of trust”: Information policies ex-
tend to business partners. The information
policies and practices of employer-sponsored PHRs
should follow the data through chain of trust agree-
ments that require business partners to adhere to
the employer’s applicable policies and practices.
BP7. Data security. Employers should provide a strong
level of security to safeguard the information in
the PHR systems. A robust authentication pro-
cess for access to PHRs should be required, in
addition to an audit trail that shows who has ac-
cessed information and when.
BP8. Data management. Employers should ensure
that the PHR systems they provide have compre-
hensive data management strategies that protect
the integrity of the data and include data reten-
tion policies.
BP9. Enforcement and remedies. Employers should
establish oversight and accountability mechanisms
for adhering to their PHR policies and practices.
Employers should put into place a mechanism to
promptly notify employees of any inappropriate
access to or use of information contained in an em-
ployee’s PHR, identify the steps which have been
taken to address the inappropriate activity, and
make resources available to employees to assist
them in addressing the effects of the inappropri-
ate activity.
BP10. Portability. Employers should offer PHRs that
are portable, to the extent feasible, allowing em-
ployees to maintain or move the PHR and/or the
data it contains even after employment or cover-
age ends or changes.
We note that the ONC Framework largely covers these
practices. There are some aspects specific to PHR systems,
such as Patient-entered data (BP3) and portability (BP10).
There are some aspects specific to employer-provided sys-
tems, such as Education (BP2). BP5 mentions the concept
of a “proxy”, which is not mentioned by any of the other
frameworks, except ONC4 (in the details). The “chain of
trust” concept (BP6) is more explicit than in any of the pri-
vacy frameworks, except the HPP’s own earlier framework
(see HPP2). There is explicit mention of the requirement to
notify the Patient of any inappropriate disclosure (BP9); the
ONC Framework only mentions such notice in its detailed
comments, and only as an example of a reaction and not as
a requirement. The Common Framework (below) mentions
a similar requirement in its detailed comments about CF7.
3.4 Markle: Common Framework (2008)
The Markle Foundation launched a project “Connecting
for Health”, which brought together a wide range of stake-
holders in developing a “Common Framework”, a model for
healthcare information exchange [24]. The Common Frame-
work (CF) describes both policy and technical principles for
healthcare information exchange, and provides concrete pro-
totypes of each: everything from patient consent forms to
data-interchange formats and information architecture. The
Center for Democracy & Technology later endorsed the pol-
icy aspects of the Common Framework in their own policy
document [8]. We quote the top-level description of the CF
principles here.
CF1. Openness and transparency: Consumers should
be able to know what information has been col-
lected about them, the purpose of its use, who
can access and use it, and where it resides. They
should also be informed about how they may ob-
tain access to information collected about them
and how they may control who has access to it.
CF2. Purpose specification: The purposes for which
personal data are collected should be specified at
the time of collection, and the subsequent use
should be limited to those purposes, or others
that are specified on each occasion of change of
purpose.
CF3. Collection limitation and data minimiza-
tion: Personal health information should only be
collected for specified purposes and should be ob-
tained by lawful and fair means. The collection
and storage of personal health data should be lim-
ited to that information necessary to carry out
the specified purpose. Where possible, consumers
should have the knowledge of or provide consent
for collection of their personal health information.
CF4. Use limitation: Personal data should not be dis-
closed, made available, or otherwise used for pur-
poses other than those specified.
CF5. Individual participation and control: Con-
sumers should be able to control access to their
personal information. They should know who is
storing what information on them, and how that
information is being used. They should also be
able to review the way their information is being
used or stored.
CF6. Data quality and integrity: All personal data
collected should be relevant to the purposes for
which they are to be used and should be accurate,
complete, and up-to-date.
CF7. Security safeguards and controls: Reason-
able safeguards should protect personal data against
such risks as loss or unauthorized access, use, de-
struction, modification, or disclosure.
CF8. Accountability and oversight: Entities in con-
trol of personal health information must be held
accountable for implementing these principles.
CF9. Remedies: Remedies must exist to address se-
curity breaches or privacy violations.
The ONC Framework covers all these principles. CF1 is
covered by ONC3 (Openness and transparency), and ONC1
(Individual access). CF2 is covered by ONC5 (Collection,
use, and disclosure notification) and ONC1. CF3 is covered
by ONC5 and ONC4 (Individual choice). CF4 is covered by
ONC5. CF5 is covered by ONC1 and ONC4. CF6 is cov-
ered by ONC6 (Data quality and integrity). CF7 is covered
by ONC7 (Safeguards). CF8 is covered by ONC8 (Account-
ability). CF9 is covered by ONC8 and ONC2 (Correction).
Furthermore, we see little in the ONC principles that is
not covered in the Common Framework, except that ONC1
provides more explicit statement that Patients should have
an easy method to obtain their PHI, ONC2 provides an
explicit statement that Patients should be able to correct
mistakes in their records, ONC3 explicitly states openness
about policies and technologies, and ONC4 emphasizes that
Patients should be able to make informed choices.
[As an aside, we note that it may be difficult to decide
how and whether to provide Patients with the capability to
edit, annotate, and delete PHI in their record. The right
policy depends on the type of record; a PHR, for example,
allows a Patient to upload their own PHI, may allow them to
annotate PHI give by a healthcare provider, and may allow
them to delete data they have entered or whole sections of
data (e.g., all the data from a given provider). An EHR,
however, forms part of the official records of a healthcare
organization and must necessarily be more strict. A Patient
might request annotations or even deletions; such changes
would be subject to provider approval and be marked as
Patient-initiated; ‘deleted’ data may be retained for recovery
under certain override conditions (such as an audit). The
“right” policies are a delicate balance of Patient rights, legal
limits, and provider operational necessities. In general, our
position is that providers should honor such requests unless
there is a good reason not to do so.]
In a few cases, the ONC framework allows more flexibility,
suggesting rather than requiring. For example, CF5 bluntly
states that “consumers should be able to control access to
their personal information”; ONC4 (individual choice) al-
lows significant flexibility, only requiring that “individuals
should be provided a reasonable opportunity” for choice,
and (in the details) that “the degree of choice available may
vary. . . ”.
We believe that the Common Framework is a crisper state-
ment of the important principles; it is also more explicit in
emphasizing that data should be used only for the purpose
for which it was collected, and that Patients should have
control over what is collected and to whom the data may be
disclosed.
3.5 CCHIT’s certification criteria (2008)
The Certification Commission for Healthcare Information
Technology (CCHIT) is a non-profit organization that cer-
tifies healthcare information systems, and they recently re-
leased their certification criteria for PHRs. Although it ap-
pears that they have a process in place to determine these
criteria, and that the process may enable and encourage up-
dates to the criteria, we quote the current list of criteria as
published in a booklet copyrighted in 2008 [7].
CCHIT1. Consent. You should be in control of your per-
sonal health information and how it is used. PHRs
that meet certification requirements must include
safeguards that require you to give your explicit
consent before your account is opened, or allow
you to opt out of the service. It also must al-
low you to decide if your data can be collected,
displayed, accessed, stored, released or disclosed.
CCHIT2. Controlling Access to your Information. Your
PHR should give you the ability to decide what
information is private and to restrict access to it.
Your PHR provider must get your permission to
gather or disseminate any information about you.
You also decide who else can view information in
your PHR, and limit the types of information that
can be viewed.
CCHIT3. Conditions of Use. The conditions for using
your PHR should be explicitly explained to you,
and you have the right to challenge your PHR
provider if it does not comply with the conditions
of use. If conditions of use are changed, your PHR
provider is required to notify you of the changes.
CCHIT4. Amending the Record. You should have the
ability to change or request changes to your health
record via email or telephone, and the telephone
number of customer service must be posted on the
Web site of your PHR provider.
CCHIT5. Account Management. Your PHR provider
must have a way for you to terminate your ac-
count, if you wish, and to confirm that all your
personal data has been deleted from the system.
CCHIT6. Document Import. Your PHR system should
be able to retrieve health records, explicitly label
and manage your personal health information and
be able to distinguish between data entered by
you and data retrieved from other sources.
CCHIT7. Data Availability. Your system should allow
you to view or print your health information when-
ever you need it.
It is instructive to compare these criteria with the HPP
Best Practices for PHR systems, since both attempt to cover
the same ground. CCHIT1 (consent) is covered by BP3
(choose which content), BP4 (control access), and BP1 (trans-
parency). CCHIT2 (control) is similar to BP4 (control).
CCHIT3 (conditions of use) is similar to BP1 (transparency
and notice). CCHIT4 (amending) is mentioned by BP3, al-
though BP3 calls it “annotating” rather than “amending”,
which in some contexts may be an important difference.
CCHIT5 (the ability to delete your account) is not cov-
ered by any HPP Best Practice, which is an interesting
omission. CCHIT6 (document import) is about capabil-
ity (ability to import documents) and about distinguishing
user-entered data from provider data (which is mentioned
by BP3). CCHIT7 (availability) is not covered by any HPP
Best Practice, even BP8 (data management).
There are many of HPP’s Best Practices that do not ap-
pear in the CCHIT criteria. In particular, BP1 is more spe-
cific than CCHIT3 about the presentation and quality of the
terms and notification, BP2 (education of the user) is not
covered, BP3 is more clear that sources of data should be
clearly identified, BP4 precludes employer use of employee
PHR data, BP4 requires an audit trail and that the au-
dit trail be easily available, BP5 allows the designation of
proxies, BP6 requires the “chain of trust” in which privacy
policies follow the data to other business partners, BP7 re-
quires strong mechanisms for security, access control, and
access logs, BP8 requires data-integrity policies and mech-
anisms, BP9 requires notice and assistance in the event of
a data breach, and BP10 requires PHR portability to new
employers. None of these aspects – many of which we be-
lieve are important properties – are covered by the CCHIT
criteria, leading us to the opinion that the CCHIT Criteria
are too weak and should be strengthened.
Similarly, the CCHIT criteria fall short of the ONC frame-
work. ON3 (openness and transparency) is covered some-
what by CCHIT3 (conditions of use), but not the require-
ment (stated in the details) for access to an audit log. ONC4
(individual choice) says (in the details) that a Patient should
be able to designate a proxy, which is not mentioned in the
Criteria. ONC5 (collection, use, and disclosure) limits the
collection, use, and disclosure of PHI to the minimum neces-
sary for a particular purpose and the Criteria have no such
concept; of course, a PHR is intended to collect PHI more
widely than an EHR, at the discretion of the Patient, but
this concept should still apply to the disclosure and use of
PHR information. ONC6 (data quality and integrity) states
the obligation of providers to ensure records are complete
and correct; no such requirement appears in the Criteria.
ONC7 (safeguards) describes security and data-integrity re-
quirements, which do not appear in the Criteria. Although
CCHIT1 says the Patient should be able to challenge the
PHR provider if they do not follow their terms of use, the
Criteria have nothing like ONC8 (accountability) that re-
quires the PHR provider to have mechanisms for monitor-
ing internal compliance, and for notifying Patients if there
is a data breach. Again, it is our opinion that the CCHIT
Criteria are too weak and should be strengthened.
3.6 Others
We have insufficient space here to describe in depth all of
the relevant privacy frameworks.
We note with interest an earlier, detailed survey of privacy
principles for healthcare, by Buckovich et al. [6]. Although
interesting, this 1998 survey pre-dates all of the documents
we survey here, even pre-dating HIPAA.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data [27] is an old list
of eight principles that, although not specific to healthcare,
has inspired all of the above frameworks.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) published
a privacy framework, a set of “information privacy princi-
ples”, in 2005 [3]. This framework is not specific to health-
care, and is meant more generally for the commercial use
of personal information. One analyst, however, shows that
there are too few details – and far too much flexibility – in
the APEC Framework for it to be useful [31].
The International Security, Trust, and Privacy Alliance
conducted a 2007 analysis and comparison of several impor-
tant privacy frameworks from around the world [18]. The
committee that developed the ONC Framework considered
this document in their work. Although not specific to health-
care, this document is helpful because it brings a broad, in-
ternational perspective to privacy frameworks, and attempts
to provide uniform definitions for common terms. Although
their final list of definitions are not a set of principles, im-
plicit in these terms are the core concepts of many privacy
principles. These definitions build on their earlier work, a
Privacy Framework [17], although that document is mostly
focused on an architecture for “services and capabilities” in
handling personal information throughout its life cycle. It
does little, specifically, to generate a precise set of principles.
The Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) re-
leased a security framework for healthcare in March 2009,
but it is available only to member organizations and only for
a fee [19]. Little information is available about this frame-
work and it is not clear whether it includes a comprehensive
set of privacy principles.
4. AN MHEALTH PRIVACY FRAMEWORK
So, after reviewing all those conceptual privacy frame-
works, which one do we recommend as the basis for re-
search and development in mHealth systems? Both the ONC
Framework and the Common Framework (CF) are appeal-
ing, because both are recent (2008), both are fairly complete,
and both were developed by diverse groups of experts and
stakeholders. We chose to use the Common Framework for
four main reasons.
First, the CF more clearly states the fundamental pri-
vacy principles for healthcare information systems. The
ONC Framework leaves many important issues to the de-
tails, rather than expressing them in the main bullets. In-
deed, the ONC Framework leaves certain issues implicit.
When privacy is at stake, it is important to be explicit. Sec-
ond, the ONC Framework is less concrete, leaving flexibility
on several principles. We believe it is important to state the
core principles, clearly and simply, and to aim implemen-
tations at them. Third, the CF has a more Patient-centric
viewpoint. Finally, concrete materials accompany the CF
principles: everything from patient consent forms to data-
interchange formats and information architecture.
We restate CF principles for completeness.
CF1. Openness and transparency
CF2. Purpose specification
CF3. Collection limitation and data minimiza-
tion
CF4. Use limitation
CF5. Individual participation and control
CF6. Data quality and integrity
CF7. Security safeguards and controls
CF8. Accountability and oversight
CF9. Remedies
We cannot resist the temptation to incorporate a few im-
portant principles best described by other frameworks:
• From BP3: Patients “should be able to annotate the
records submitted by others, as well as to enter their
own information, with employee-entered data marked
as such.”
• From BP5: Patients “can designate proxies to act on
their behalf. [Patients] should determine who, includ-
ing family members and caregivers, should have direct
access to their PHRs on their behalf. Where possible,
[Patients] should be able to grant proxy access to full or
partial information in their PHRs, including access in
emergency circumstances. [Patients] should also have
the ability to revoke access privileges.”
• From BP6: “The information policies and practices. . .
should follow the data through chain of trust agree-
ments that require business partners to adhere to the. . .
applicable policies and practices.”
• From ONC1: Patients should have an easy method to
obtain their PHI in a readable electronic format.
• From ONC2: Patients should be able to correct mis-
takes in their records.
• From ONC3: The system should be open about the
policies and technologies in use.
• From ONC4: Patients should be able to make informed
choices about what data is collected, how it is used,
and to whom it is disclosed.
• New: the presence of medical sensing devices, or of
sensor-data collection, should not be observable by
nearby parties (this privacy threat is unique to mHealth).
In summary, there are several existing conceptual privacy
frameworks. Each has been developed by experts in the
field, usually by large bodies of diverse stakeholders who
have worked for months or years to examine relevant laws,
documents, and current practices. Many of the above frame-
works have been developed after studying the others, and
thus there is a significant degree of overlap. On the other
hand, there is a surprising degree of difference in the princi-
ples, and some frameworks have notable omissions. There is
fairly broad agreement about general principles, but there
is room for reasonable disagreement about the details, in
part because there are difficult trade-offs between protect-
ing privacy and providing efficient, effective healthcare. The
NCVHS discussed several of these issues in 2006 [11], and
revisited some of them in 2008 [26]. We chose the Com-
mon Framework (CF) as our own working framework for
the purpose of research and development, albeit with some
appendages drawn from some of the other frameworks.
5. PRIVACY PROPERTIES
A high-quality mHealth system should protect privacy
and data integrity, remain available, and be auditable. We
derive the following properties from the above privacy prin-
ciples (as specified in parentheses below), and add the neces-
sary integrity, availability, and auditability properties. (See
Table 1 to cross-reference with the above frameworks.) Fi-
nally, we list the functional properties for completeness.
Security and privacy properties.
A high-quality mHealth system should:
P1. Inform patients (CF1, CF2, ONC1, ONC4)
a. What PHI is collected and stored
b. Why PHI is collected and stored
c. Where PHI is stored and at which organization
d. Who has access to their PHI, and under what circum-
stances
e. When PHI collection purpose (why) changes or access
(who) changes
f. How their PHI is used
g. About risks of data collection or disclosure
h. About security breaches or PHI misuse
P2. Enable patients to review storage and use of their PHI
(CF5)
a. Review historical records of all information in prop-
erty P1.
P3. Enable patients to control, through informed consent
(CF1, CF3, CF5, ONC4, BP5),
a. What PHI will be collected and stored, and in what
contexts
b. When PHI will be collected and stored (allowing pa-
tients to stop and restart data collection)
c. Who will have access to their PHI (including Patient
proxies), and in what context
d. How their PHI may be used, and in what circum-
stances
P4a. Enable patients to access their PHI (CF1, ONC1, BP3).
P4b. Honor patients’ requests to add, annotate, correct and
delete their PHI (CF6, ONC2, BP3), where possible.
P5. Provide easy-to-use interfaces for all of the above, in-
cluding clearly defined terms and a layered presenta-
tion that allows interested users to dig into the details.
P6. Limit collection and storage of PHI (CF3)
a. As needed for specified purpose
b. Per limitations of patient consent
c. Using lawful and fair means
P7. Limit use and disclosure of PHI to those purposes pre-
viously specified and consented (CF4, CF7)
a. Policies should follow PHI as it flows to other entities
(BP6)
P8. Ensure quality of PHI (CF6)
a. Ensure data freshness and accuracy when collected
b. Ensure data integrity and completeness during trans-
mission, processing, and storage
c. Ensure authenticity of patient providing input or wear-
ing sensor
d. Ensure authenticity and quality of sensors
P9. Hide patient identity, sensor presence and data-collection
activity from unauthorized observers
P10. Support accountability through robust mechanisms (CF8)
a. Include audit logs for all access, addition, deletion, and
modification of PHI (the MN, too, should log its ac-
tions with respect to collection, upload, and access to
PHI, and pairing with SNs and other devices)
P11. Support mechanisms to remedy effects of security breaches
or privacy violations (CF9)
Table 1: Comparison of our security and privacy properties with other major frameworks; a framework item
is mentioned if it covers some, though not necessarily all, of our property.
Property ONC HPP BP CF CCHIT
P1 Inform patients ONC1,3,4 HPP4,6 BP1 CF1, CF2 CCHIT3
P2 Review storage and use ONC1 HPP3 CF5
P3 Informed consent ONC4 HPP4,6 BP5 CF1, CF3 CCHIT1,3
P4 Access, annotate, correct ONC1, ONC2 HPP3 BP3 CF1, CF6 CCHIT4,5,6,7
P5 Usable interfaces other frameworks do not emphasize usability
P6 Limit collection and storage ONC5 HPP6 BP3 CF3 CCHIT2
P7 Limit to specified purposes ONC5 HPP2 BP4, BP6 CF4, CF7
P8 Ensure quality ONC6, ONC7 BP7, BP8 CF6, CF7
P9 Hide from observers this property is specific to mHealth
P10 Accountability ONC8 BP4 CF8
P11 Remedies BP9 CF9
not related to privacy HPP1,8,9,10 BP2,BP10
Functional properties.
A high-quality mHealth system should be:
P12. Flexible, supporting multiple types of data
a. Streaming data, i.e., high-frequency, periodic data
b. Event data, i.e., low-frequency aperiodic data
c. Patient-entered data, using one or more modes of input
P13. Scalable, to large numbers of participants (Patients
and Consumers) and devices (MNs, SNs)
P14. Efficient, particularly regarding resources on MN and
SN (CPU, memory, bandwidth, energy)
P15. Usable
a. Patient: physical usability of sensors, i.e., preserve
wearable-ness
b. Patient and provider: easy interfaces for data collec-
tion and access
c. Physically challenged Patients: accessible interfaces
for informed consent and control over PHI
P16. Manageable
a. Ensure remote configurability and calibration of sys-
tem components
b. Ensure ability to remotely manage lifecycle of software
and credentials in system despite having no control
over OS and firmware updates of system machinery
c. Enable easy provisioning and de-provisioning of health
applications, tools and data
P17. Available, preventing loss of (or loss of access to) PHI
a. At MN, data latency and risk of loss must balance
against resource limitations
We recognize that there are many subtle and in many in-
stances, challenging, aspects to supporting these properties
in an mHealth system, and that many of these properties
are not unique to mHealth. Some of these properties will
require support on the SN and MN; others may be achieved
only in the back-end servers (HRS) or the data consumer’s
system (Client). Careful study is needed, in the context of a
system design, to identify which properties will need support
on the mobile platform. For example, the interface designed
to ensure property P1 on a mobile node must be highly user-
friendly because of the limited viewing area on its screen; the
interface may have to be multi-modal to convey information
effectively to the patient. As another example, because mo-
bile nodes are highly vulnerable to physical loss or theft,
they must be remotely manageable; i.e., an administrative
entity must be able to disable or lock the mobile node re-
motely and prevent patient data from being stolen.
6. CASE STUDY
Here we illustrate how some of the aforesaid properties
can be realized in a “privacy aware” mHealth system.
Ravi is a diabetic who finds it difficult to manage his
condition effectively, resulting in significant variation of his
diurnal blood-glucose levels, and frequently elevated blood
pressure and cholesterol levels. Ravi’s doctor advises him
to subscribe to a Diabetes Management Program offered by
his hospital. As part of the program, Ravi wears a hospital-
provided device that continuously monitors his activity level
and calories burned. The device is designed as a wrist watch
to improve usability and to prevent anyone in Ravi’s vicin-
ity from detecting that he is wearing it (P9-hide sensor
presence). Upon first use, the device records features of
Ravi’s pulse waveform (plethysmograph). Whenever Ravi
takes the device off his wrist and wears it again, the device
uses the plethysmograph as a biometric to authenticate him.
As long as Ravi wears the device, it monitors his activity and
wirelessly sends encrypted data to his smartphone.
Also as part of the program, Ravi’s smartphone is pro-
visioned with certified software and a set of cryptographic
keys. Upon installation and setup, the software on the
smartphone uses one or more of the keys to authenticate the
wrist device. The software further verifies that the device is
properly calibrated and un-tampered, thereby ensuring data
quality and integrity (P8-ensure quality of PHI). The
software processes data it receives from the device and ac-
quires other contextual information such as Ravi’s location
(using GPS or Wi-Fi localization), ambient audio (using a
microphone), calendar schedule and time of the day. This
data is used to infer social context (such as whether Ravi is
at home or at the office, in conversation or alone). The soft-
ware reminds Ravi to take his medication, alerts him to long
periods of inactivity, encourages him to log diet information
and tracks his daily goals of calorie intake and expenditure.
The phone synchronizes data with Ravi’s PHR server.
Figure 2: Screenshot of example policy
Before starting data collection, the smartphone applica-
tion presents Ravi with a privacy policy; one screen of a
sample policy is shown in Figure 2. Ravi observes that the
privacy policy is easy to understand, clear and concise (P5-
easy to use interfaces), unlike verbose privacy policies on
some health websites. The privacy policy clearly conveys
(P1-inform patients) information about the collection,
use, and storage of Ravi’s Personally Identifiable Informa-
tion (PII, a super-set of PHI).
After disclosing information about what PII will be col-
lected and why, who has access to the PII and how it will be
used, the software seeks Ravi’s consent to begin using the
system (P3-informed consent). Specifically, the software
presents Ravi options in the form of check boxes that allow
him to control data collection and dissemination. It allows
Ravi to control data collection by enabling him to specify
times of the day during which data can be collected – by
turning ON/OFF location sensing, audio sensing, and med-
ical sensing (P3-enable patient to control data collec-
tion and dissemination). It also allows Ravi to control
data dissemination by specifying who (people, roles, or orga-
nizations) has access to his PHI and at what level of detail.
Ravi allows detailed access to his PHI (including context)
to his doctor and spouse, allows the insurance company ac-
cess to his aggregate health trends, and allows researchers
access to anonymized aggregate data only. Ravi also names
his spouse as a “proxy”, allowing her to act on his behalf and
with all privileges equivalent to his. These steps are com-
pleted in the hospital under the supervision of an expert
who can answer Ravi’s questions about the privacy issues
and policy interface, but Ravi can revisit this interface and
change his preferences at any time.
An embedded accelerometer in the wrist device monitors
Ravi’s activity in terms on number of walking steps, and an
optical sensor monitors his pulse rate (which is used to esti-
mate exercise intensity). The system is able to accommodate
real-time streaming data, periodic and aperiodic sampling of
location information, audio and schedule; it also allows Ravi
to manually enter diet information (P12- flexible). A fu-
sion algorithm on the smartphone estimates Ravi’s context,
which serves both to augment the medical data in the PHR
and more immediately to provide customized and relevant
reminders, tips, and motivational messages that encourage
him to increase physical activity and control his diet. For
example, when the smartphone determines that Ravi is run-
ning late for a meeting, it avoids prompting him to take the
stairs instead of the elevator. Or, when the system deter-
mines that Ravi is in conversation, it avoids using spoken
motivational messages.
Using authentication keys retrieved from a secure internal
storage area, the smartphone periodically connects with the
backend server to upload his activity, diet and context in-
formation, and to obtain messages for Ravi that arise from
either automated or human analysis of his data. Ravi also
receives a username and password for a secure web interface
accessible from any computer (P4-enable patients to ac-
cess, add and annotate their PHI). The web interface
presents detailed charts and trends of his health parameters,
activity, diet information and established context, which
help him to review, introspect and improve his lifestyle. Per
Ravi’s privacy choices, the same information is available to
his spouse and doctor for review. However, the insurance
company may only access high-level information about his
fitness level. This is sufficient for the insurance company as
Ravi’s insurance premium depends on his fitness level.
Whenever Ravi is wearing the wrist device, he can seam-
lessly use his smartphone to view the backend-stored PII.
When the wrist device is not present, or cannot biomet-
rically verify Ravi as its wearer, the smartphone will only
provide access to PII after entry of the password. This ap-
proach provides ease of use in the common case but prevents
misuse in the case of device loss or device theft.
The backend server maintains audit logs (P10-support
accountability) of all accesses, additions, and updates to
Ravi’s PII. With his password, Ravi can review at any time
who has accessed which parts of his PII and when. The
system also has mechanisms to send an alert SMS to Ravi’s
smartphone in case there is an unauthorized access to Ravi’s
PII or if there is a security breach.
Periodically, Ravi’s smartphone receives mHealth software
updates, because the software comes with a maintenance
contract. Security-related patches are automatically installed,
and new features are optionally installed. This remote man-
ageability (P16-manageable) protects Ravi’s PII and keeps
Ravi’s interest with the addition of novel features.
After one month, Ravi’s smartphone is stolen while he is at
the gym. With one call to his cellular carrier, his old phone is
remotely disabled (destroying all the keys and PII stored on
the phone) and a new phone is sent by courier. Fortunately,
Ravi’s service contract (with the mHealth software provider)
also supports him in the case of a lost device, so the new
phone arrives pre-configured with the necessary software and
encryption keys, and automatically recognizes the sensors
Ravi had paired with his earlier phone.
7. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In this section, we highlight some of the key research prob-
lems that must be solved to realize an mHealth system that
possesses the properties described in Section 5.
1. Consent Management: How can patients use their
mobile node (MN) to easily manage consent, i.e., ex-
press preferences over collection, dissemination and re-
tention of PHI, and make consent decisions when re-
quests occur? Usable and accessible interfaces are key.
2. MN Architecture: How should MN hardware and
software architecture change to help protect patient
privacy and enable them to manage privacy? For ex-
ample, what hardware and software enhancements would
help enforce patient privacy preferences? In what way
are these enhancements different from those required
to support other functional and security properties?
3. Enforcing control over data: How can patient pri-
vacy policies be securely bound to personal health in-
formation (PHI) and enforced on PHI data (for ex-
ample, auto-destruct data after a specified time limit,
limit the number of views, limit the number of copies,
or identify the entity responsible for copying data)?
4. Data identity: How can patient data be labeled such
that consumers of that data (e.g., doctors) can ver-
ify the assertion that this data belong to this patient,
without compromising patient privacy?
5. Anonymization: What are effective algorithms to
anonymize PII before disclosing it to another party,
e.g., for research or for a medical opinion?
6. Accountability: What mechanisms can be used to
support accountability (i.e., make consumers of PHI
accountable to the patient for using PHI according to
her preferences) and non-repudiation?
7. Ecosystem: What are the ecosystem support roles
in an mHealth system? We have initially identified
five roles (Figure 1); policy makers, certification bod-
ies, manufacturers, distribution & management, and
a public-key infrastructure. What policy and legal
frameworks need to be in place for them to serve these
roles?
8. Tradeoffs: Solutions to the problems above involve
many tradeoffs, such as between anonymity and ac-
countability, or patient authenticity and privacy. An
important research challenge, then, is to develop a
conceptual working framework to help identify these
tradeoffs within a solution space and choose an appro-
priate balance when making design decisions.
8. SUMMARY
This paper makes four primary contributions. First, we
compare existing privacy frameworks, with an eye to mobile
healthcare and home-care systems. We quote or paraphrase
the top-level principles given in each framework, then com-
pare and contrast the frameworks, identifying key differences
and shortcomings. Second, we identify a privacy framework
for such systems, using the Common Framework as a core
and drawing a few principles from other frameworks. No
one framework captured all of the privacy principles we be-
lieve should be followed. Third, we extract a set of privacy
properties intended for use by those who design systems and
applications for mobile healthcare and home-care systems,
linking them back to the privacy principles. Finally, we list
several important research questions that the community
should address.
We hope that the privacy framework in this paper can
help to guide the researchers and developers in this com-
munity, and that the privacy properties provide a concrete
foundation for privacy-sensitive systems and applications for
mobile healthcare and home-care systems. There remain
many technical challenges to realize these properties, given
the constraints of mobile systems and the need to present
usable interfaces on tiny devices to patients and providers
(many of whom have limited technology background).
In mobile healthcare and home-care systems, the poten-
tial is great, the opportunities endless, and the challenges
exciting. Let’s all be sure that patient privacy remains one
of the core requirements.
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